THE ETHICS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING
Abstract of a dissertation at the University of Miami.
Dissertation supervised by Professor Alan Goldman. Number of pages in text. (208)
Throughout this work I judge the
ethics of genetic cases in light of our considered moral judgments in analogous
non-genetic cases. In Chapter One,
I offer refutations of common objections raised against therapeutic genetic
engineering. In Chapter Two, I
argue that therapeutic engineering is morally permissible.
In Chapter Three, I argue that therapeutic engineering can also be
morally obligatory. In Chapter
Four, I turn to the common objections made against enhancement genetic
engineering, and offer refutations of them.
In Chapter Five, I argue that enhancement engineering is morally
permissible. In Chapter Six, I
argue that genetic enhancement can also be morally obligatory.
In Chapter Seven, I focus on the ethics surrounding the controversial
genetic alteration of such traits as disability, race, sex, and sexual
orientation. I argue that it is
wrong to select for disability, but that it is permissible to select for race,
sex, and sexual orientation.